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FOREWORD 
Agricultural policies affecting farm prices and 
incomes as well as programs to implement these 
policies are subjects of great concern to farmers 
and also to the general public. The issues involved 
are controversial and subject to lively debate. 
Many statements, papers and publications have 
dealt with these issues. All too often these have 
been based on subjective opinions, prejudices and 
emotions, with little regard for basic facts and 
reI a tionshi ps. 
Agricultural policy, as a subject-matter area, 
is amenable to research. Policy research is re-
lated to, and depends in part on, research in such 
areas as price analysis, farm management and 
agricultural adjustments. However, the purposes 
and orientation of policy research are different. 
In 1952 the directors of the agricultural experi-
ment stations in the North Central Region took 
action to initiate regional research in this im-
portant subject-matter area. A technical commit-
tee consisting of a representative from each agri-
cultural experiment station in the North Central 
Region was organized. A program of research 
was developed which, in its initial phases, was to 
investigate policies and programs affecting com-
modities important to the region. These included 
wheat, dairy products, corn, hogs, beef cattle and 
poultry products. 
This publication is the first regional bulletin to 
be published from this project. It has been de-
veloped through a subcommittee in charge of the 
corn policy subproject consisting of the repre-
sentatives from the states of Iowa, Illinois, Indi-
ana and Missouri. Additional regional bulletins 
are expected to be published as the work of the 
technical committee progresses. 
The following persons have served on the tech-
nical committee: 
E. J. Working, Illinois 
*Vincent 1. West, Illinois 
*J. C. Bottum, Indiana 
*Geoffrey S. Shepherd, Iowa 
George Montgomery, Kansas 
James O. Bray, Kansas 
Bernard J. Bowlen, Kansas, 
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Max Myers, South ,Dakota 
Richard Newberg, South Dakota 
H. W. Halvorson, Wisconsin 
C. PEAIRS WILSON 
Administrative Adviser 
·Members of subcommittee for Subproject No.3. Corn. 
PREFACE 
This is the first report from the corn subcom-
mittee of the North Central Regional Research 
Committee on Agricultural Price Policy, under 
project NCM-11. 
Research men are naturally inclined to work 
their data over with meticulous care and delay 
publication until all their results can be shown 
in relation to each other in a comprehensive re-
port. The subcommittee believes, however, that 
this is not the best way to proceed with the corn 
study and get the results of the research out into 
public use. The corn program is so big and di-
verse that it has to be broken down into manage-
able parts for analysis. The results of these 
analyses can then be published in a series of 
studies, each one dealing with a limited part of 
the field and published as soon as it is ready. 
Accordingly, we are planning to conduct the 
study a step at a time and to publish the results 
of the research on the effects of the USDA corn 
program on producers, marketing agencies and 
consumers, in a series of separate reports, each 
report dealing with one part of the whole study. 
Each one of these reports will be published when 
it is ready, while the work on the later topics is 
still proceeding. Each report, therefore, will be 
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a progress report, subject to reVISIOn if subse-
quent work shows that this is necessary. 
The preliminary titles of this prospective 
series of reports are listed below. The present 
report is the first of the series. 
1. Effects of the corn storage program on corn 
carryover stocks and corn utilization. 
2. Effects of the corn storage program on corn 
prices and livestock production. 
3. Effects of the corn acreage control program 
on corn and other feeds production. 
4. Effects of the corn program on producer's 
and distributor's incomes and consumers' satis-
faction. 
5. Effects of the corn program on grain dis-
tributors and processors. 
A final report will be published eventually, re-
vising and summarizing these progress reports 
and pulling them together in a comprehensive 
rep'ort covering the corn program as a whole, 
including a discussion of the estimated effects of 
alternative programs. 
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SUMMARY 
This report analyzes the effects of the USDA 
stabilization program on corn year-end carryover 
stocks and corn utilization. It also presents data 
on the cost of the program to the USDA. 
The objectives of the program were to stabilize 
corn and other feed grain utilization and prices 
and to raise the long-run level of those prices. 
In pursuit of these objectives, a program of non-
recourse loans to farmers on corn sealed in cribs 
on their farms was undertaken, supplemented 
later by provisions for purchase agreements and 
loans stored in commercial warehouses. This 
stabilization program was backed up' in some 
years by acreage control programs designed to 
reduce corn production. 
The "total realized cost" of the corn price and 
production programs to the USDA from 1932 to 
1955 was $1.3 billion. Most of this consisted of 
payments under the acreage control program; the 
cost of the eee price-support storage operations 
was only $227 million. Most of this cost was in-
curred in fiscal 1954 and 1955, when storage 
stocks were larger than in earlier years. On the 
basis of the 1955-56 program, it is likely that the 
cost of eee corn storage operations in the future 
will run at about $100 million per year. If the 
soil bank program is effective in reducing corn 
production, that may reduce the size of the stocks 
and thus reduce the cost of the storage operations. 
EFFECTS ON CORN STOCKS 
The size of the total year-end (Oct. 1) carry-
over stocks of corn has increased over the past 30 
years, reaching a peak of 1.2 billion bushels in 
1956. 
From 80 to 85 percent of these total stocks 
in 1954 and 1955 were owned or under loan by 
the eee. The quantity of corn in private hands 
in recent years has been declining slightly. The 
large eee holdings in the main are in addition 
to private holdings; only to a minor extent are 
they a displacement .of private holdings. 
The year-end storage stocks of corn on farms 
have been somewhat more concentrated in Iowa 
and, to a lesser extent, in the adjacent states. 
From the first, the eee stocks were more heavily 
concentrated in Iowa and adjacent states than the 
farm stocks; the concentration of eee stocks in 
Iowa has increased somewhat with the passage 
of time. 
The chief factor determining the quantity of 
corn put under loan is the relation between the 
market price of corn and the corn loan rate and 
the size of the corn crop. The lower the market 
price compared with the loan rate, the more corn 
goes under loan. The correlation between the 
total supply of corn Oct. 1 and the quantity of 
corn put under loan is positive, but it is rather 
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low. The size of the corn crop is another factor 
that has some positive influence. The percentage 
of compliance may be another. 
EFFECTS ON CORN UTILIZATION 
The eee year-end carryover stocks are large 
at the end of a large crop year and small at the 
end of a small crop year. They thus absorb part 
of the variations in production; the year-to-year 
variations in corn utilization (consumption) are 
about half as great as the year-to-year variations 
in production. The eee storage program appears 
to have stabilized corn supplies (corn utilization) 
about 50 percent. 
SIZE OF STORAGE STOCKS NEEDED FOR 
STABILIZATION PURPOSES 
On a purely physical basis, stabilization (year-
end carryover) stocks of about 1.1 billion bushels 
would be needed to stabilize the market supplies 
of corn completely against year-to-year variations 
in corn utilization. 
Variations in the demand for corn are more 
difficult to cope with, since they usually vary over 
longer and less predictable periods of time than 
year-to-year variations in production. But if it 
is deemed desirable to use storage operations to 
meet variations in demand for corn with corre-
sponding variations in market supplies, during 
the first year before corn production has time to 
respond to an increase in demand, additional 
stocks of perhaps 400 million bushels might be 
sufficient for this purpose. The total stocks then 
would be 1.5 billion bushels. 
Under the existing loan program, complete 
stabilization of corn consumption is not likely to 
be attained, because there is some flexibility in 
the loan rates and because corn prices decline 
some distance below the loan rates before farmers 
put much corn under loan and let the eee take 
it over. In actual practice, storage stocks are not 
likely to reach the 1.5 billion figure needed for 
complete stabilization. The size of stocks actually 
attained is more likely to be about 1 billion 
bushels. 
The Agricultural Act of 1949 set up a table of 
loan rates that varied inversely but less than 
proportionally with total corn supplies (produc-
tion plus stocks). This provided some automatic 
safeguard against storage stocks becoming larger 
than needed for stabilization purposes. A still 
more effective safeguard against stocks becoming 
too small as well as too large might be provided 
if the loan rates were constant when total supplies 
ranged from 3.6 to 4.2 billion bushels, but varied 
inversely and proportionately with total supplies 
above and below that range. 
Effects of the USDA Corn Storage Program on 
Corn Carryover Stocks and Corn Utilization 
BY GEOFFREY SHEPHERD AND ALLEN RICHARDS 
Free market prices for farm products were the 
regulators of agricultural production and con-
sumption in the United States until about the end 
of the 1920's. They did their work impersonally 
and, in the main, effectively. The prices of farm 
products fluctuated widely from season to season, 
from year to year and from peak to trough of 
industrial activity, but they generally cleared the 
market. Through thick and thin-large crops 
and small crops, strong demand and weak demand 
-farm products kept moving through from pro-
ducer to consumer under the guiding influence 
of varying free market prices. 
But this performed only one part of the func-
tion of prices. Variations in prices were wide and 
rapid enough to keep farm products moving into 
consumption in quantities that were in line with 
production, but they were too wide and rapid and 
erratic to perform their second function well-
to serve as reliable guides to producers. In addi-
tion, prices exercised another one of their func-
tions-allocation of income to producers-with 
undue harshness because of the inelasticity of the 
supply responses of agricultural producers. 
In a period of strong demand, for example, high 
prices would stimulate increased seeding, breed-
ing and feeding; yet, in many cases, by the time 
the product arrived at the market, demand had 
weakened and prices had fallen. Variations in 
supply were similarly erratic. Sometimes the 
weather would be good, and crops would be large; 
at other times, bad weather might cut the size 
of the crop in half. Sometimes a period of bumper 
crops would coincide with a period of weak de-
mand, and vice versa. 
These variations in prices regulated the flow 
of farm products to consumers, but they were 
confusing to producers. Farmers could not plan 
their production programs accurately, nor tell 
beforehand how they were going to come out on 
their operations by the end of the year. Some live-
stock producers tried to maintain the same live-
stock program year in and year out, leaving a 
margin of safety for protection against unpredict-
able fluctuations in prices. Others-"inner and 
outer's"-tried to guess what changes were 
coming and often guessed wrong. Sometimes large 
crops were produced when small crops were 
wanted,and vice versa. Free market prices were 
unable to keep the production of agricultural 
products constant from year to year when the 
demand was constant, nor changing in the right 
direction and the right amounts when the demand 
changed. 
The variations in prices that result chiefly from 
variations in general demand are well reflected 
in fig. 1, which shows the prices received and 
prices paid by farmers from 1910 to date. 
VARIATIONS IN CORN AND OTHER FEEDS PRODUCTION 
The variations in prices that result from vari-
ations in supply differ from crop to crop. This 
report deals primarily with corn and the other 
feed crops. 
The nature and extent of the variations in the 
production of corn and the other feed crops is 
shown in table 1 and fig. 2. 
This table and chart clearly show the over-
whelming importance of corn in total feed grain 
production. 
The greatest change in corn production from 
one year to the next took place from 1947 to 1948, 
when production increased more than 1.3 billion 
.FARMERS' PRICES 
% OF 1910.14 ,,-----,----,-----,----
300r-----4~---_+---
200 f----.,/1 
100~~~-_4~----4\ 
1940 1950 
• IoiON,HtJ OJ.t4 
·'NClUO!S U"rUEST. run. ANO WACf ""HS. A~NUAt AV OArA, 1910.211 
.., QUAlH'S. IU~ 16, IF MONTHS, lUI TO o"lt 
0. S. blE'''"TltIlfHT OF AIItICULTURE NEG. U.S5 (10) AGIiIII::ULTUAJ.1. .... "":ETING SERVICE 
Fig. 1. Prices received and prices paid by farmers in the United States 
1910-56. The lower section of the chart .howe the percentalfe!l 
that prices received were of parity prices. 
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TABLE 1. FEED GRAINS: PRODUCTION, UNITED STATES, 
1920-55. 
(million tons) 
Year Corn· Oats Barley 
All ~orghum 
for grain 
1920 ................. 85.9 23.1 I 4.1 2.5 1921. ................ 81.9 16.7 3.1 2.0 
1922 ................. 75.8 18.3 3.6 1.4 
1923 .......... , ...... 80.5 10.6 3.8 1.7 
1924 ................. 62.2 22.5 3.0 1.7 
1925 ................. 78.3 22.4 4.6 1.6 
1926 ................. 71.3 18.4 4.0 2.0 
1927 ................. 73.3 17.5 5.7 2.3 
1928 ................. 74.6 21.0 7.9 2.2 
1929 ................. 70.5 17.8 6.7 1.4 
1930 ................. 58.2 20.4 7.2 1.1 
1031. ................ 72.1 18.0 4.8 2.0 
1932 ................. 82.0 20.1 7.2 1.9 
1033 ................. 67.1 11.8 3.7 1.5 
1934. ................ 40.6 8.7 2.8 0.5 
1935 ................. 64.4 19.4 6.9 1.6 
1936 ................. 42.2 12.7 3.5 0.8 
1937 ................. 74.0 18.8 5.3 2.0 
1938 ................. 71.4 17.4 6.1 1.9 
1939 ................. 72.3 15.3 6.7 1.5 
1940 ................. 68.8 10.9 7.5 2.4 
1941. ................ 74.3 18.9 8.7 3.2 
1942 ................. 85.9 21.5 10.3 3.1 
1943 ................. 83 0 18.2 7.8 3.1 
1944 ................. 86.5 18.4 6.6 5.2 
19~5 ................. 80.3 24.4 6.4 2.7 
1946 ................. PO. 1 23.6 6.3 3.0 
1947 ................. 6.'.9 18.8 6.8 2.6 
1948 ................. 100.9 23.2 7.6 3.7 
1949 ................. 90.7 19.5 5.7 4.2 
1950 ................. 86.1 21. 9 7.3 6.5 
1951. ............... 81.9 20.4 6.2 4.6 
1952 ........... .... 92.2 19.5 5.5 2 5 
1953 ............ 99.Q 18.5 5.9 3.2 
1954 85.6 22.6 9.1 6.6 1955. : :::::::: ..... 90.8 24.0 9.6 6.8 
1956t ................ 01.5 18.3 8.3 6.0 
• Production for all purposes. 
t Preliminary. July 1956 estimate. 
Source: U. S. Dept. Agr. Grain and feed statistics through 1954. U. S. 
Dept. Agr. Stat. Bul. 159, March 1955, p. 3; and U. !'. D~t. 
Agr., Agricultural Marketing Service. The feed sltuatlOn. 
July 1956, p. 5. 
bushels. The variations resulting from the 
drouth years of the 1930's were almost as great. 
"Year-to-year changes in United States corn pro-
duction during the past 30 years (1919-1948) 
averaged 408 million bushels, or about 15 percent 
of the average production for the period (2,635 
million bushels) ."1 
1 U. S. Dept. Agr., Bureau of Agricultural Economics. The feed situa-
tion. December 1948. p. 11 
PRODUCTION OF FEED GRAINS 
Fig. 2. Production of corn and other feed grains in the United States, 
annually, 1920-55. 
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This quotation understates the variation from 
a storage point of view. It deals only with dif-
ferences in corn production from one year to the 
next. A corn storage program needs to take into 
account more than the changes from one year to 
the next, since corn production occasionally 
changes in the same direction, or remains high or 
low, for 2 or 3 consecutive years. A run of two 
or three crops, each 10 percent above average, 
would show no change from year to year but 
,would build up storage stocks. 
The coefficient of variation is a standard meas-
ure that more accurately reflects the size of the 
storage problem. This coefficient of variation of 
corn production over the 30-year period from 1919 
to 1948 was 14.1 percent. This means that, in 
a normal distribution of sizes of crops, a band 
ranging from 14.1 percent above average pro-
duction to 14.1 percent below average production 
-a total range of 28.2 percent-would include 
68 percent of the series of corn crops. Also, a 
range from 14.1XO.67=9.5 percent above and 
below average production-a total range of 19 
percent-would include 50 percent of the series 
of corn crops. 
The production of other feed crops (principally 
oats) appears in fig. 2 to be less variable than 
corn. But this appearance is deceptive, resulting 
from the smaller average size of the crop. Pro-
portionally, the coefficient of variation for oats-
16.1 percent-is greater than for corn. 
The variations in production cause still greater 
variations in prices. The demand for corn is 
relatively inelastic; the coefficient of elasticity is 
about -0.65. A change of 10 percent in produc-
tion causes an opposite change of 160 = 15 per-O. 5 
cent in prices. The price of corn is still more re-
sponsive to variations in production of total feed 
grains. The elasticity in this case is -0.5.2 
Figure 3 (from Foote et a1.3 ) shows that "the 
great bulk of year-to-year variation in corn pro-
duction is due to variations in yield. Corn acreage 
is quite stable, rarely changing by more than 3 or 
4 percent from one year to the next. Even acreage 
allotments have not caused sharp reductions in 
total corn acreage. 
"The maximum year-to-year change. in corn 
production due to an acreage shift has been about 
200 million bushels. But yield effects exceeded 
1,000 million bushels on two occasions (1936 to 
1937, and 1947 to 1948) and exceeded 500 million 
bushels on nine occasions during the 1901-50 
period. 
"Variations in corn yields around their normal 
or trend level are shown in the central section of 
figure 3. On three occasions during 1901-50, corn 
yields dropped more than 10 bushels per acre 
below trend. At present acreage levels, this would 
mean a production deficit of 800 to 900 million 
2 Richard J. Foote, John W. Klein and Malcolm Clough. The demand 
and price structure for corn and total feed concentrates. U. S. 
Dept. Agr. Bul 1061. October 1952. pp. 39-40. 
3 Ibid. pp. 42 and 43. 
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Fig. 3. Effects of changes in corn acreage and corn yield on com pro-
duction, United States, annually, '1920-62. 
bushels. On four other occasions, yields were at 
least 4 bushels below trend, involving production 
deficits of about 350 to 600 million bushels. There 
were also five occasions on which corn yields ex-
ceeded their trend by at least 4 bushels, involving 
production excesses (above average) of about 350 
to 650 million bushels. In 36 years out of 50, corn 
yields were within less than 4 bushels of the 
trend, and corn production was within less than 
10 percent (about 300 million bushels) of its 
trend level." 4 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM 
The demand that something be done about the 
instability of the prices of farm products became 
insistent during the 1920's, when violent varia-
tions in demand due to economic causes were 
added to the violent variations in corn and other 
feed production due to physical causes. Farmers 
became very much concerned about the drastic 
effects on their incomes of the decline in prices 
that resulted from the decline in demand after 
World War I. The income-allocating function of 
prices was more prominent in their minds than 
the production-guiding function. 
After a sharp postwar decline in 1920, agri-
4 U S. Dept, Agr. Long range farm program. Technical studies by 
the u. S. Department of Agriculture relating to selected farm price 
support proposals. U. S. Govt. Print. Off., Washington, D. C. 1954. 
p.41. 
cultural prices continued to vary erratically be-
low their prewar relation to other prices. Farmers 
urged that the USDA go beyond merely reporting 
supply, demand and the prices; they urged that 
it take hold of prices, smooth them out (or at 
least reduce their variability) and raise their 
level. Farm price legislation to this end was 
passed twice during the 1920's, but both times 
it was vetoed by Coolidge. In 1929 under Hoover, 
the Federal Farm Board was organized with a 
revolving fund of half a billion dollars-a large 
sum of money for those times. 
The Board immediately proceeded to "take hold 
of prices." It began stabilization operations in 
wheat in September 1929, and in cotton in Oc-
tober. At first it made loans in an attempt to 
keep prices at the loan levels; then it began mak-
ing direct purchases at the loan levels. Thus it 
proceeded further than taking hold of prices; it 
took hold of part of the supply as well. 
It could hardly have chosen a worse time. The 
stock market crashed in October 1929, and the 
deep and long industrial depression of the 1930's 
began. During the next 2 years, agricultural 
prices fell nearly 50 percent. The Federal Farm 
Board soon committed all of its half-billion-dollar 
revolving fund and lost its ability to support 
prices. It was terminated in May 1933.5 
The Federal Farm Board not only was born at 
a bad time but, in addition, it had tried to stabilize 
the prices of cotton and wheat, two of the most 
difficult crops to support. Cotton and wheat are 
both international commodities, and their prices 
are set by world forces in world markets. Oper-
ations in anyone country could not be expected 
to succeed, any more than an Iowa corn program 
could be expected to succeed alone in the United 
States. 
THE COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION 
The Commodity Credit Corporation was organ-
ized in October 1933 to stabilize prices by storage 
operations. The Agricultural Adjustment Ad-
ministration was set up in the same year to con-
trol production. 
The CCC proceeded to do much as the Federal 
Farm Board had done before it. The CCC im-
mediately made loans on cotton and corn, well 
above open-market levels, and began to accumu-
late storage stocks as the Farm Board had done. 
The objective of the CCC (or "ever-normal 
granary," in literary terms) was clearly stated 
by Henry Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, in 
1937. 
"By the ever-normal granary I mean a definite 
system whereby supplies following years of 
drouth or other great calamity would be large 
enough to take care of the consumer, but under 
which the farmers would not be unduly penalized 
in years of favorable weather. During the past 
Ii For a more extended account and appraisal of the Federal Farm 
Board operations, see: M. R. Benedict. Farm policies of the United 
States, 1790-1950. Twentieth Century Fund. 1953. Chs. 12ff; and 
G. Shepherd. Agricultural price control. Iowa State College Press, 
Ames, Iowa. 1945. Ch. 8. 
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7 years, weather, prices, and supplies have swung 
so violently from one extreme to the other that 
it is time for all thoughtful men and women, 
whether living on the farm or in town, to con-
sider what· action may be taken to promote 
greater stability." 0 
The objectives of AAA were somewhat less 
clearly stated in the next paragraph: 
"To keep the government from committing a 
'farm board' it will be necessary after supplies 
under the loan program have reached a certain 
point to keep the granary from running over by 
some practical program of production adjust-
ment. I call this part of the ever-normal granary 
program 'storing the grain in the soil' instead of 
'storing it in the bin.' After the consumer is 
adequately taken care of by the building up of 
certain supplies, it is cheaper for the farmer, 
consumer, and government alike to store addi-
tional quantities in the soil rather than in the bin. 
If the weather is going to be unusually violent in 
its swings, it is necessary for man to be unusually 
intelligent in meeting the problem. I believe the 
ever-normal granary is a start." 7 
This paragraph calls for "production adjust-
ment" to keep the granary from running over. 
On this basis, the objective of the AAA was simi-
lar to the stabilization objective of the CCC. It 
merely went further and called for "storing the 
grain in the soil" instead of in the bin, when 
swings in the weather were unusually violent. 
A more recent statement concurs with Wallace's 
original statement of the objective of the CCC. 
It is more specific and names storage as a means 
for attaining greater stability in market supplies 
and prices. 
"A major objective of storage policy in recent 
years has been to reduce fluctuations in farm 
prices and smooth out the flow of the main stor-
able crops into domestic use and the foreign mar-
ket. One of the basic causes of such fluctuations 
is the variability of crop yields and acreage. Vari-
ations in crop yields from year to year are mainly 
due to factors beyond human control. 
"If we do not want such pronounced changes in 
consumption and exports as occur in crop yields 
or if we want greater stability in the price struc-
ture, a part of the fluctuations in production must 
be absorbed by storage operations." 8 
It is evident from these quotations that the 
chief stated objective of the CCC storage pro-
gram was to reduce the unpredictable year-to-year 
variations in the market supplies of "the main 
storable crops" that result from variations in 
production caused by year-to-year variations in 
the weather. In the case of corn, the smoothing 
out of the year-to-year variations in corn supplies 
was expected to have the further effect of reduc-
ing the year-to-year variations in hog production 
6 Henry A. Wallace. The agricultural situation. U. S. Dept. Agr., 
Bur. Agr. Econ. March 1, 1937. p. 9. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Reserve levels for storable farm products, a study of factors. 
relating to the determination of reserve levels for storable farm 
products. Senate Document No. 130. 1952. p. 1. 
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and prices that result from year-to-year varia-
tions in corn supplies and prices. 
The CCC, however, went further than "mere 
stabilization." It was impressed with the import-
ance of the income-allocating function of prices 
too. It, therefore, embarked on a policy of raising 
the level of prices over a period of years, as well 
as stabilizing them. The Farm Board had said 
in its last annual report in 1933: "Many people 
have thought 'stabilization' means to hold the 
price permanently higher than it would be other-
wise. This cannot be done without control of 
production." The CCC believed that it could 
profit by the Farm Board's experience; it pro-
ceeded to set loan rates "permanently higher 
than they otherwise would be," but it believed 
that it would be protected against the fate that 
had overtaken the Board, because the AAA would 
control production. 
The importance of this second objective, raising 
prices over a period of years, is indicated in the 
1940 annual report of the president of the CCC-
the first such report to be published. In this re-
port, the raising of prices was listed as the first 
of "the three fundamental functions of the (Com-
modity Credit) Corporation's loan programs: 
Namely, to protect and increase farm prices, to 
stabilize farm prices, and to assure adequate sup-
plies of farm products" (i.e., to stabilize sup-
plies).o Thus the CCC relied on the AAA to re-
duce crop production below average, not merely 
as an emergency measure to be used as a last 
resort if stocks grew too large, but as a continuing 
feature of the program for raising prices over a 
period of years. 
The second objective of the CCC, therefore, 
went beyond stabilizing prices. The second ob-
jective was to "stabilize them upward" in a whim-
sical phrase current at the time. This second 
objective, in simpler language, was to raise the 
long-run level of prices as well as to stabilize 
them. This raising of the long-run level was to 
be accomplished by AAA acreage controls de-
signed to reduce acreage and production and thus 
support prices above long-run competitive levels. 
OPERATIONS OF THE eee 
From October 1933, when the CCC was created, 
to June 30, 1948, the CCC operated under a Dela-
ware charter. Its status as an agency of the 
United States was granted by statutes expiring 
at intervals of one or more years. Effective July 
1, 1948, the Corporation was granted a Federal 
charter, making it a permanent agency of the 
United States. Public Law 344, 84th Congress, 
approved August 11, 1955, increased the author-
ized borrowing power of the Corporation (i.e., 
the amount outstanding at anyone time) to $12 
billion. 10 The CCC thus was able to operate on 
a scale about 10 times greater than the Farm 
9 U. S. Dept. Agr. Report of the President of the Commodity Credit 
Corporation. 1940. P. 4. 
10 On July 2, 1956, Congress raised this figure to $14.5 billion. 
Board, taking the lower purchasing power of the 
dollar into account. 
The Farm Board, in its stabilization operations 
for wheat and cotton, had relied mainly on loans 
to cooperatives and direct purchases in the mar-
kets. The CCC operated differently. It made 
some commodity loans (loans on basic commod-
ities produced by farmers) directly to farmers, 
but in most cases it simply underwrote commodity 
loans made to farmers by ordinary commercial 
banks who had entered into agreements with CCC. 
The loans were nonrecourse loans. If the market 
price of the crop rose above the loan rate plus 
interest after the lo~n was made, the farmer could 
redeem his loan and sell the crop at the higher 
price. But if the market price remained below the 
loan rate, the farmer could default on the loan and 
let the CCC take over the collateral, without re-
course on the farmer for the difference between 
the loan rate and the price. The collateral then 
became the property of the CCC.ll 
11 "Loans made to eligible growers on farm-stored corn are evidenced 
by a promissory note secured by chattel lien on the corn. Loans 
on warehouse-stored corn are evidenced by a promissory note se-
cured by the warehouse receipt. These loans may be made by the 
Corporation direct or by private lending agencies operating under 
a form of lending agency agreement with the Corporation. The 
grower may payoff his loan at any time up to the maturity d~te 
at its face value plus accrued Interest. Loans have been e"tended 
beyond their maturity dates on several crops, the grower having 
been given the option of resealing his corn, redeeming It, Or de-
livering it to the Corporation in satisfaction of the loan." (U. S. 
Dept. Agr., Commodity Credit. Corporation. Corn price-support 
loan operations 1933-1952. Mimeo report. P. 2.) 
LEVEL OF LOAN RATES 
Up to this point, the present report has dealt 
with the development of the agricultural stabili-
zation program as a whole. From this point on, 
the rest of the report concentrates primarily on 
the corn program. 
Under the CCC program, loans were made on 
varying quantities of corn every year from 1933 
on. In general, the CCC carried over from one 
crop year to the next quantities of corn which 
varied directly with the size of the crop. 
Table 2 and fig. 4 show the loan rates and 
prices by years from 1933 to date. They also 
show the quantities placed under price support. 
Data for oats, barley and grain sorghums are 
given in table 3. 
At first, the loans were made at moderate rates, 
and the severe drouths of 1934 and 1936 along 
with general recovery from the depression raised 
corn prices. Accordingly, from 1933 to 1937 the 
CCC had no problem of supplies accumulating on 
its hands. Farmers were well pleased with its 
operation; there was a natural and pleasant as-
sociation in their minds between the CCC's oper-
ations and the rise in prices that took place during 
the first few years of the CCC's life. 
By the latter part of 1937, however, the picture 
suddenly changed. In spite of acreage reductions, 
high yields of cotton, corn and wheat in 1937 
TABLE 2. CORN : AVERAGE PRICE, SUPPORT PRICE AND QUANTITY PLACED UNpER SUPPORT 1933-66. 
Placed under price support 
Average ):,rire Purchase Percenta~e or 
Year beginning October National avera.ge loan rate November-May· Differenoet Loanst agreements Total production 
(dollars (pereenta~e (dollars (dollars (rr iIIion bushels) (mil:ion bushels) (million bushels) per bushel) or parity) per bushel) per bushel) (percent) 
1933 ............................. 0.45 55 0.45 0.00 268 ................ 268 11.2 
1934 ............................. 0.55 65 0.83 0.28 20 ................ 20 1.4 
1935 ............................. 0.45 55 0.56 0.11 31 ................ 31 1.3 
1936 ............................ 0.55 66 1.06 0.51 ........ iii 00' ... ................ ........ iii 00···· I 1937 ............................. 0.50 59 0.51 0.01 ................ 2.3 
1938 ............................. 0.57 70 0.44 -0.13 
..... "302'" ... ................ 230 9.0 1939 ............................. 0.67 70 0.55 -0.02 ................ 302 11.7 
1940 ............................. 0.61 75 0.58 .... ·{l.03 103 ................ 103 4.2 
1941. ............................ 0.75 85 0.74 -0.01 111 ................ III 4.2 
1942 ............................. 0.83 85 0.90 0.07 56 ................ 56 1.8 
1943 ............................. 0.90 85 1.12 0.22 8 ................ 8 0.3 
1944 ............................. 0.98 90 1.07 0.09 21 ................ 21 0.7 
1945 ............................. 1.01 90 1.15 0.14 3 ................ 3 0.1 
1946 ............................. 1.15 90 1.38 0.23 26 
......... itf'" 26 0.8 1947 ............................. 1.37 90 2.20 0.83 1 1 § 
1948 ............................. 1.44 90 1.20 -0.24 355 106 551 15.3 
1949 ............................. 1.40 90 1.18 -0.22 329 58 387 11.9 
1950 ............................. 1.47 90 1.55 0.08 51 2 54 1.8 
1951. ............................ 1.57 90 1.66 0.09 25 I 26 0.9 
1952 ............................. 1.60 90 1.47 -0.13 309 108 417 12.7 
1953 ............................. 1.60 90 1.42 -0.18 369 102 471 14.8 
1954 ............................. 1.62 90 1.38 -0.24 199 59 258 8.6 
1955 ............................. 1.58 90 1.21U -0.37 338H 27§1 36611 Il.5n 
1956 ............................. 1.50 82 .................. .............. ................ ................ ................ ................ 
• Average price received by farmers in period when moet of the corn i. placed under price support. In recent years, loans have heen available from 
time of harvest through May. 
t Average price above or below national avemge loan rate. 
:I: Excludes purchase agreement corn placed under loan in the following year during the period 1948 to date. 
§ I.es. than 0.05 percent . 
•• Includes 14 million bushels of 1937 corn placed under loan for first time in 1938 under short term loan' program. 
tt Purchase agreements not available before 1947. 
:1::1: Preliminary. 
§§ Through April 15, 1956; loan period ends May 31 in most areas. 
Compiled from reports of Commodity Stabilization Service. 
Source of table: U. S. Dept. Agr. Agricultural outlook charts 1956. November 1955. Table 6, P. 68: U. S. Dept. Agr. Grain and feed statistics 
through 1954. U. S. Dept. Agr. Stat. Bul. 159. Marc:, 1955. Table 48 p. 46; and U. S. Dept. Agr., Agricultural Marketing 
Service. The feed situation. May 1956. p. 21. 
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Fig. 4. United States average price of corn. loan rate (support price) 
and quantity of corn placed under loan (price support). an. 
nually, 1933·55. 
carried the production of those products well 
above the average. Supplies increased and the 
industrial "recession" in the latter part of 1937 
reduced the general demand. 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 in-
cluded a formula or schedule under which the loan 
rate for corn was to vary inversely with the esti-
mated total production of corn, below the basic 
rate of 75 percent of parity. The bottom of the 
range of loan rates, reached if the total production 
exceeded normal by more than 25 percent, was 52 
percent of parity. During the next 3 years, from 
1938 to 1940, the loan rates for corn were set close 
to the top of the range provided by this schedule. 
They were set at 70, 69 and 75 percent of parity, 
respectively. 
These loan rates were high enough to cause a 
rapid increase in the quantities of corn put under 
price support. Figure 4 shows that the quantities 
rose to a record 300 million bushels in 1939. By 
1940, the total year-end stocks of corn Oct. 1 rose 
to a record high at that time of 687 million 
bushels. 
By 1941, the eee was heading into the same 
sort of trouble that had killed the Farm Board. 
Supplies of corn, cotton and wheat were accumu-
lating rapidly. By the fall of 1941, the equivalent 
of a full crop of cotton, half a crop of wheat and 
a quarter of a crop of corn had accumulated in 
storage. Some of the cotton stocks were 7 years 
old. Grain storage elevators were over-burdened, 
and embargoes had to be applied at several termi-
nal markets. One eee official envisioned a com-
plete breakdown of the corn acreage reduction 
and loan program by the end of 1941, because the 
loan rates had been set too high and by too arbi-
trary a formula, and because the AAA had not 
been able to reduce production enough to support 
the loan rates.12 
WORLD WAR II AND AFTERWARDS 
Then the United States entered World War II 
in December 1941. This changed the situation 
completely. The insatiable demands of war drew 
down the accumulated stocks. Surpluses were re-
placed by shortages, and rationing and price 
ceilings were instituted to hold down the demand. 
The war and postwar boom was followed by a 
comparatively mild recession. Prices declined and 
stocks accumulated again, to higher levels this 
time than they had reached in 1941. But again 
war rescued the eee ; the military activity during 
the Korean conflict that broke out in 1950 stimu-
lated an increase in demand that drew stocks 
down. The high level of preparedness that 
seemed essential in the cold war after Korea kept 
demand at a high level. 
12 C. F. Sarle. then Director, Research Division. CCC. Private com-
munication. 
TABLE 8. OATS. BARLEY AND GRAIN SORGHUMS: PRICE SUPPORTS AND QUANTITY PLACED UNDER PRICE SUPPORT, 
UNITED STATES, 1940·55.* 
Crop of 
National average 
price support 
per bushel 
(dollars) 
Oats 
Placed under 
price support t 
(million bushels) 
1940 ............................................................................. . 
1941. ............................................................................ . 
1942 ............................................................................. . 
1943 ............................................................................. . 
1944 ............................................................................ .. 
1945 ..................................... . 
1946 ..................................... . 
1947 ................................. · .... . 
1948 ..................................... . 
1949 ..................................... . 
1950 ..................................... . 
1951. ................................... .. 
1952 .................................... .. 
1953 .................................... .. 
1954 ..................................... . 
1955 ..................................... . 
1956 ..................................... . 
0.48 
0.53 
0.63 
0.70 
0.69 
0.71 
0.72 
0.78 
0.80 
0.75 
0.61 
0.59 
3 
········ .. 23········ 
41 
15 
13 
21 
56 
75 
68 
Barley Grain sorghums 
-N-at-ion-.l-av-er-ag-e-I-----National average 
price support 
per bushel 
(dollars) 
0.35 
0.45 
0.65 
0.75 
0.85 
0.80 
0.83 
1.03 
1.15 
1.09 
1.10 
1.11 
1.22 
1.24 
1.15 
0.94 
0.93 
Placed under price support Placed under 
price support t per cm. price support t 
1-----------1-----------
(million bushels) (dollars) (million cwt.) 
7 
16 
15 
. .... ······3····· ... 
. .................. . 
49 
33 
31 
17 
10 
45 
115 
96 
0.54 
0.71 
0.98 
1.52 
1.70 
1.65 
1. 72 
2.12 
2.31 
2.09 
1.87 
2.17 
2.38 
2.43 
2.28 
1.78 
1.80 
. .......... i; ...... .. 
.................... 
40 
84 
60 
15 
4 
45 
114 
106 I·· .... ·· .. · ........ · 
* Loan program for oats started in 1945. Loan rates on all three grains varied by counties from 1945 to date. 
t Total quantity placed under loan, 1940-47, and under loan and purchase agreement. 1948 to date. 
Compiled from reports of the Comomdity Stabilization Service: and U. S. Dept. Agr., Agricultural Marketing Service. The feed situation. May 
1956. p. 21. 
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After fighting cea~ed in Korea, corn storage 
stocks grew large. Corn acreage allotments were 
used again in 1954, 1955 and 1956, but total corn 
acreage was not reduced much. Production con~ 
tinued high, and stocks continued to accumulate. 
By Oct. 1, 1956, corn stocks in all positions 
amounted to 1.2 billion bushels, the largest in his~ 
tory. The average farm price of corn in Decem~ 
ber 1955 was $1.15 per bushel, 43 cents below the 
loan rate. Farmers complained that the corn pro~ 
gram was not working well; a series of House 
hearings held in the eorn Belt in October 1955 
revealed considerable concern about the Whole 
farm price support program. Congress passed 
a new agricultural act in Apri11956, raising loan 
rates to 90 percent of parity. This bill was vetoed 
by President Eisenhower, and the corn loan rate 
for the 1956 corn crop to cooperators in the com-
mercial corn area was set at $1.50 per bushel but 
not less than 82.5 percent of the parity price at 
the beginning of the marketing season. This $1.50 
was 86 percent of the March 15 parity price; 
however, the announcement did not commit the 
Department of Agriculture to a support price of 
86 percent of parity. 
eOSTS OF THE CORN PROGRAM 
A program like the corn program involves sev-
eral kinds of costs. It involves direct money costs 
and indirect money costs, and some costs that are 
difficult to measure in monetary terms-the costs 
of alternatives foregone, the costs in terms of 
utility or satisfaction borne by other producers 
and by consumers, etc. 
A full analysis of these costs would constitute 
a report in itself. For the purposes of the present 
introduction, it is sufficient to report merely the 
simplest, most important and most clear~cut item 
of cost-the direct money cost to the USDA. Even 
this item involves some important matters of 
judgment, as we shall see. 
"The direct money costs to the USDA" sounds 
like a clear~cut concept. But what is the direct 
money cost of half a billion bushels of corn under 
loan, which mayor may not be taken over later 
by the Cee? And for that matter, what is the 
cost of half a billion bushels of corn that has been 
taken over? Most of it will be sold back to the 
market within a few years; some of it may go 
out of condition and have to be sold at a loss. 
The solution which the USDA has come up 
with is the concept of "realized cost." 
"Realized cost means the net cost which has 
actually been incurred to date. It was adopted· 
as the basis for the statement because (1) it is a 
realistic measure of the actual financial results 
of program operations and (2) it is a common 
denominator which can be applied to all programs 
regardless of how they are financed. It is realistic 
because it takes into account only those trans~ 
actions which actually have an ultimate financial 
impact. For example, the advancing of a loan to 
a borrower under one of the Department's lend~ 
ing programs is not considered a cost. It is re-
garded as an investment which will be repaid. 
However, the interest paid by the government on 
funds provided for lending purposes is considered 
a realized cost of the year in which it accrues. 
Similarly, interest collected from the borrower 
is included as income, or a reduction of cost. The 
principal amount of a loan becomes a cost only 
in the event the borrower defaults and the loan is 
written off by the Department. This example is 
illustrative of how the realized cost approach 
comprises elements of cost as distinguished from 
cash outlays, and how it also takes into account 
income or negative cost items. The realized cost 
basis can be applied to all programs regardless 
of how they are financed since, regardless of how 
funds are made available for carrying out a pro~ 
gram, there is in each instance a measurable net 
co.st of operations to date. Many of the Depart-
ment's programs are financed directly from ap~ 
propriations, some activities are carried out by 
corporations using their corporate funds, and 
others are operated from revolving funds. Funds 
available, therefore, is not a practicable common 
denominator for all programs, and it likewise does 
not take into account income or offsetting receipts 
arising from operations. Realized cost does not 
include any element of anticipated gains or losses 
and, accordingly, it is not synonymous with ac~ 
crued cost or accrued income and expense." 13 
Keeping this definition of cost in mind, let us 
see what the realized cost of the CCC program 
haS been. 
REALIZED COST OF THE CORN PROGRAM 
The official data published by the USDA show 
that the "realized cost of agricultural programs 
primarily for stabilization of prices and farm in~ 
comes," over the fiscal years 1932~55, was $9,819 
million.14 This cost is shown by commodities in 
table 4. 
This table shows that the wheat program has 
cost the most of any commodity-$2.4 billion. Cot-
ton comes second with $1.6 billion. Corn comes 
third with $1.3 billion. 
The costs of the corn program are broken down 
into separate items by years in table 5.15 This 
table shows that the largest item of cost in the 
corn program was the acreage control program. 
Parity payments came second. The cost of the 
storage program was comparatively small; the 
"cce loan, purchase and payment costs" were 
only $227 million. This is only 17 percent of the 
total cost of the corn program. 
Figure 5 shows, however, more clearly than 
table 5, that the small size of the storage costs in 
relation to the total costs resulted from the situa-
tion in the early years of the program, not in the 
later years. In the last 3 years shown on the 
13 Statement by the USDA, mimeo, undated, prepared by Office of 
Budget and Finance. 
14 F. D. Stocker. Governmental cost in agriculture. U. S Dept Agr 
Agricultural Research Service. (Mimeo.) May 1956. P: 39.' ., 
15 Ibid. p. 41. 
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TABLE 4. REALIZED COST OF AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS 
PRIMARILY FOR STABILIZATION OF PRICES AND FARM 
INCOME, 1932.55, SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF COST 
BY COMMODITY GROUPS. 
BaBic commodilie' 
Corn .................................................. . 
Cotton ................................................ . 
Peanuts .............................................. .. 
Rice ................................................. ,. 
Tobacco ............................. · ...... · .......... . 
Wbe.t ................................................. . 
Total basic ..........................•...•........... 
Designafed non-baric commodifi .. 
Butter ......................................... ········ . 
Cheese ............................................... .. 
Milk ................................................. .. 
Pot.toes ............•.......•......................... · . 
Woo!.. ................................................ · 
Other ................................................. . 
Total design.ted non·basic ........................... . 
OIh .. non-baBic commodili.8 
fr.:~ ~il: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 
Sugar ................................................. . 
Program expen ......................................... . 
Tot.1 other non-b.sic ............................... . 
1nt .... f cosf, efc . ............. , .............................. . 
Grand total.. ...................................... . 
(millions of dollars) 
$1,319.3 
l,~gU 
29.3 
101.8 
2,412.9 
S 481.3 
142.4 
351.0 
638,4 
105.7 
14.0 
S 331.5 
14a.1 
$5,632.7 
St,733.3 
310.8 (gain\ 
1,863.3 
52,011.5 
442.0 
$9,819.3 
Source: U. S. Dept. Agr., Office of Budget and Finance. 
chart, the 'storage costs make up the bulk of the 
total costs of the whole corn program. 
Since the present report is concerned primarily 
with the eee storage program, we will deal with 
the "eee loan, purchase and payments costs" 
of $227 million first. The costs of the acreage 
control and parity payment programs will be con-
sidered in a later report. 
COST OF THE CORN STORAGE PROGRAM 
There are three reasons for the relatively low 
cost of the eee storage operations shown in table 
5. One is that the storage operations were not 
conducted on a very large scale until quite recent 
years. The second is that the general price level 
rose markedly after 1933; this helped the eee 
keep its inventory losses low and, in fact, enabled 
it to make some inventory gains. The third reason 
is that the eee has not sold much of its stocks 
CI) 
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Fig. 6. Total cost of the corn program, and CCC corn storage cost,. an· 
nually, 1933·35. . 
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during the past few years when the loan rates 
for corn have been declining; 
If all commodities acquired by the eee could 
be disposed of without any losses, the "realized 
cost" figure would be a reasonably accurate meas-
ure of the total cost of the storage program. But 
it is likely that some of the commodities in stor-
age will have to be sold for less than they cost, 
either because they are going out of condition, 
because they will be sold for export at reduced 
prices, or because the prices for the products have 
declined. In the latter case, substantial additional 
storage costs are likely to be incurred. 
Study of the cost data by years shows, in fact, 
that more than two-thirds of the total eee stor-
age program costs ($156 million out of a total 
of $227 million) was incurred in the two most re-
cent fiscal years, 1954 and 1955 (fiscal year 1954 
means July 1, 1953 to June 30, 1954, and similarly 
for other years). The storage stocks were built 
up to a record large size by then, and the general 
price level ceased to rise. The level of loan rates 
for corn was reduced in 1955 from $1.62 to $1.58, 
and a further reduction to $1.50 was made in 
1956. The transition to modernized parity could 
further lower the level of loan rates in 1958 and 
1959 (the 5-percent drop scheduled for 1957 was 
postponed for 1 year under the Agricultural 
Act of 1956). 
It seems likely, then, that even if corn loan 
rates were constant, the cost of eee operations 
would be more like the $75-80 million per year 
registered in 1954 and 1955 than the small figures 
of earlier years. If corn loan rates continue to 
decline, the figure is likely to be larger than $80 
million.16 In the latter part of 1955, the costs of 
storage of the eee corn inventory of 696 million 
bushels were running at about $50 million a year. 
The value (cost) of this inventory was $1,186 
million. The reserve for losses set up on the ad. 
vice of the Grain Division of the eee was $507 
million-nearly half the total value.17 
The losses from deterioration so far have been 
small. The large size of the reserve for losses re-
flects mostly the expectations of losses from prices 
below the costs of acquisition. 
How large these losses will be depends upon 
several things-the size of the corn crops in 1956 
and later years, the level of loan rates, the rapid-
ity of disposition of the present inventory, the 
effects of the soil bank, etc. If corn crops over the 
next few years are average in size, and eee in-
ventories continue to run at about present levels, 
it seems likely that the direct cost to the eee of 
. its corn stabilization operations in the near future 
will run somewhat higher than the figure was in 
1955 ($76 million) as the level of loan rates de-
clines over the next few years. On the basis of the 
1955-56 program, a reasonable estimate for the 
near future would be a round figure of about $100 
16 For the first 9 months of 1955-56, the Joss was $80 million. 
17 Commodity Credit Corporation. Commodity Inventories a.nd com-
modities under contract purchase as of October 31, 1955. (Unpub-
lished report.) 
00 
i:f 
TABLE 5. REALIZED COST OF CORN PROGRAM BY ITEMS AND BY FISCAL YEARS, 1933-55. 
(millions of dollars) 
1~~~y5 1193311934119351193611937119381193911940 1~119421194311944119451194011947119481194911950 11951 11952119531195411955 
Baoic commodilie8: 
Corn (including cornmeal and AAA cOIn-hog program): 
cec nonrecourse loan, purchase and payment programs . . . 
CCC I""""" 011 emergency reed ......................... . 
Donations or commodities to other nations ... ........... . 
Uemoval of surplus agricultural commodities: 
227.1 
17.0 
8.1 
1.1 1 3.4 I 15.61 9.5 I 4.51 0.3'1 S.1 7.4'1 0.3' 0.1'117.21 0.8 I. s'l 20.5 1 80.5 I 75.7 
16.5 0.5 
8.1 
g:~~;';c~i::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::I~I_I-I-I-I-I--I~I g:gl~:_L~I~I_I_J_I __ I __ I_I_I_I_I_I~'_ 
Total ............................................ ~ ____________ ~ ~~L-!.~ ~ ____ I ______ I __ I ____ I __ I __ ~. __ 
Federal crop insurance ................................. 1.6'1 
101.0189.9186.0186.3166.7151.2 
I I 0.3 I 0.1'1 0.5 I 0.4'1 0.5'1 0.2 I 1.5 I 1.0'1 1.4'1 0.0 
Acreage allotment payments under the Agricultural 
Conservation Progra.m . .............................. 441.0 
Agricultural adjustment programs (acreage allotments 
and marketing quotas) ............................... 22.4 
Parity payments ...................................... 347.5 160.1 I 43.8 I 43.91121.4 I 78.3 I I 5.0 I 3.9 I I 6.8 I 6.7 
Agricultural Adjustmcnt Act of 1933 and related acts: 
Corn-hog program: I I Program expenses................................. 488.7 311.9' 176.9" 
Miscellancous receipts.. .. .. . . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. .. 0.6' O. O' 
Processing taxes (net) ............................. ~__ W5.4" 137.7" 18.3" __________________ ' ____ . ____ ' ______ . __ , __ . __ , __ , __ , __ 
Total.. ........................................ ~ ___ 1105.4·1174·2 158.0 ________ 1 __ 1 __ --' __ 1 __________ 1 __ ----------
Transportation and handling of emergency feed .........•. ~ ______________ 1 __________ 1 __________________ ~I~ 
Total.Corn ............................................ 1.319.3 1105.4"iI74.21158.0 , 64.91159.-1 147.611t3.8 195.7 129.21 8.1 7.1' 0.4' 0.5 0.3" 21.7 4.9 0.3' 19.5 IHA I 91.1 
• Gain. 
million per year. If the soil bank program proves 
effective in reducing corn production, this esti-
mate could be reduced. 
EFFECTS OF THE CORN PROGRAM ON 
YEAR-END STOCKS 
Has the corn loan and storage program attained 
its objective of stabilizing market supplies and 
prices? What effects has it had on other things-
on the prices and production of hogs and other 
livestock, etc.? 
The effects of the corn storage program ramify 
out in various directions, in some cases reinforc-
ing the effects of other concurrent events, in some 
cases conflicting with them. It is not always easy, 
therefore, to determine how much of an effect 
should be ascribed to one cause and how much to 
another . We shall need to be on our guard con-
stantly to be sure that we do not attribute an 
effect to the corn loan program when in fact it 
resulted from something else. 
It is not easy to determine how much of the 
various changes that took place in corn and live-
stock supplies and prices after 1933 was due to 
the CCC loan and storage program and the acre-
age program, and how much was due to other 
forces-drouth, war, inflation, etc. But the at-
tempt is made below, with appropriate reserva-
tions expressed where they are in order. 
One of the most obvious things a corn storage 
program could be expected to do would be to affect 
the quantity of corn held in storage from year to 
year. This effect is registered in the size of the 
year-end carryover stocks-the carryover of corn 
from preceding crops into the new crop year. 
The USDA publishes quarterly estimates of the 
stocks of the various grains. The Oct. 1 estimate 
coincides closely with end of the corn marketing 
year, just preceding the new harvest. The July 
1 estimates similarly serve for oats and barley; 
they serve somewhat less well for wheat that is 
fed. 
The data for corn are given in table 6. This 
table shows the Oct. 1 stocks of corn from 1926 
(the earliest date when the data were compiled) 
to 1956 (old crop grain only). 
These data go back farther than any other stor~ 
age series. They are widely used. They show, 
however, only the CCC inventory in bins or other 
storage owned or controlled by CCC, or in transit 
to ports. They do not include CCC~owned corn in 
interior mills, elevators and warehouses, or in 
terminal markets, nor do they include corn in 
process of being taken over from loans being liqui-
dated, nor corn under loan (resealed) most of 
which will be taken over by the CCC later. Ac-
cordingly, the situation for our purposes is better 
shown in table 7, where the quantities of corn 
under loan or owned by CCC, and "other" corn 
(in private hands) are listed separately for the 
years since 1933.18 These data, plus the data from 
18 U. S. Dept. Agr., Agricultural Marketing Service. Grain and feed 
statistics through 1954. U. S. Dept. Agr. Stat. Bul. 159. March 
1955. p. 46. 
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TABLE 6. CORN: STOCKS, UNITED STATES, OCT. 1 
(OLD CROP GRAIN ONLY). 
(million bushels) 
Commodity Interior mill, 
Terminal Credit elevator and 
Year Farm market Corporation * warehouse Total 
1926 ............. 262 18 ............ ............ 280 
1927 ............. 192 25 ............ ............ 217 
1928 ............. 87 7 ............ ............ 94 
1929 ............. 142 4 ............ ............ 147 
1930 ............. 134 5 ............ ............ 139 
1931. ............ 162 5 ............ ............ 168 
1932 ............. 252 19 ............ ............ 270 
1933 ............. 327 60 ............ ............ 386 
1934.. ........... 274 64 ............ ............ 338 
1935 ............. 61 3 ............ ............ 65 
1936 ............. 171 4 ............ ............ 176 
1~37 ............. 60 6 ............ ............ 66 
1938 ............. 351 10 ............ ............ 361 
1939 ............. 554 15 15 ............ 584 
1940 ........ : .... 541 41 105 ............ 688 
1941. ............ 473 39 132 ............ 645 
1942 ............ 422 39 30 ............ 491 
1943 ............. 355 7 ............ 21 384 
1944 ............. 203 7 ............ 20 231 
1945 ............. 293 5 .... , ....... 17 315 
1946 ............. 152 5 ............ 15 172 
1947 ............. 252 8 ............ 23 283 
1948 ............. 112 1 ............ 10 123 
1949 ............. 696 10 68 70 813 
1950 ............. 471 40 253 81 845 
1951. ............ 313 33 315 79 739 
1952 ............. 171 18 245 52 486 
1953 ............. 330 9 384 45 769 
1954 ............. 359 18 468 74 920 
1955 ............. 314 32 560 129 1,035 
1956t ............ 300 64 600 201 1,166 
• Owned by CCC and stored in bins or other storage owned or con-
trolled by CCC, in transit to ports, or in Canadian elevators. Other 
CCC·owned grain i. included in the estimates by positions. 
t Preliminary. 
Source: U. S. Dept. Agr., Agricultural Marketing Service. Grain 
and f~ .tatistics through 1954. U. S. Dept. Agr. Stat. Bul. 
159. l .. arch 1955. p. 18.; 1955 and 1956 data from: U. S. 
Dept. Agr. Stocks of grains. Oct. 23, 1956. (Mimeo rept.) 
TABLE 7. CORN: STOCKS AT CLOSE OF THE MARKETING 
YEAR, UNITED STATES, 1933-54. 
(million bushels) 
Stocks of corn at the close of the marketing year 
Under loan 
or owned Year beginning OctoLer 
·---1-----1 
m~::::::::::::::::::::: ::::: ........ ~~! .... . 
m~:::::::::::::::::::::.:::: .......... ! .... . 
1937.......................... 45 
1938. .................. ....... 258 
1939. ....... ....... ........... 471 
1940 ......................... . 
1941. ........................ . 
1942 ......................... . 
1943 ......................... . 
1944 ......................... . 
1945 ......................... . 
1946 .......................... . 
1947 ......................... . 
1948 ......................... . 
1949 ......................... . 
1950 ......................... . 
1951 ......................... . 
1952 ......................... . 
1953 ......................... . 
1954 ......................... . 
1055·· ....................... . 
403 
197 
8t 
6t 
9t Ot 
9t Ot 
493t 
650f 
487§ 
306§ 
580t 
736t 
870 
1,025 
Oth.r 
256 
65 
175 
66 
316 
326 
216 
242 
294 
376 
225 
306 
172 
274 
123 
320 
195 
252 
180 
190 
184 
165 
141 
Tot.l· 
338 
65 
176 
66 
361 
584 
688 
645 
491 
384 
231 
315 
172 
283 
123 
813 
845 
740 
486 
769 
920 
1,035 
1,166 
• Includes stocks at interior mills, elevators and' warehouses for the 
years 1943 to date. 
t Loans were in the process of being repaid. Practically all of the 
corn under ~eal on Sept. 30 was redeemed by farmers early in the 
next marketmg year. 
* ~~~~~i..:~r~f~~dO~t:~~cb8Se agreement delivered to CCC or placed 
§ ~~~~~::. corn on which loans were in the process of being repaid by 
•• Preliminary estimate. 
Source: U. S. Dept. .A~r., Agricultural Marketing Service. Grain 
and feed statistICS through 1954. U. S. Dept. Agr. Stat. Bul. 
159. 1956. P. 46; and U. S. Dept. Agr., Agricultural Mar-
keting Service. The feed situation. May 1956. p. 22. 
1926 to 1932 in the preceding table, are repro-
duced in graphic form in fig. 6. 
This figure shows that while the total stocks of 
corn have been increasing, the quantities owned 
privately have been slightly decreasing. This is 
particularly evident during the past few years 
while total stocks have been large. The cce has 
been taking over part of the year-to-year storage 
function from private hands. 
The eee stores most of the corn it owns, and 
some of its other grains, in its own bins-at "bin-
sites" in the vernacular of the trade. In June 
1949, ece owned only 45 million bushels of bin-
type storage capacity for use in storing CCC-
owned grain. By September 1955, this capacity 
had been increased to 886 million bushels 334 
million of which were purchased since the e~d of 
the fiscal year 1952. 
cce purchases bins for storing Cee-owned 
commodities only for areas where commercial 
storage facilities are inadequate. This policy is 
in accord with the Commodity Credit Corporation 
Charter Act which provides that cec's authority 
to acquire real property for storage purposes shall 
::lot be utilized by cec unless CCC "determines 
that existing privately owned storage facilities 
... in the area concerned are not adequate." 
Private storage capacity has also been increas-
ing. From 1951 through 1954, off-farm commer-
cial-type grain storage capacity rose on a nation-
wide basis, from 2,176 million bushels to 2,820 
million-an increase of 644 million bushels within 
the space of 3 years. 
On Oct. 1, 1955, the CCC owned outright 681 
million bushels of corn. (The difference between 
this figure and the 850 million bushels shown in 
table 7 represents corn under loan, mostly in 
process of being taken over or resealed.) The 
CCC held most of this corn in its own storage 
structures. It held 551 million bushels in bin-
sites, 84 million bushels in country warehouses 
and elevators, 32 million in subterminal and ter-
minal elevators, and 15 million in transit.19 
Figure 7 shows the year-end government stocks 
(under loan or owned) and "other" stocks of feed 
grains (corn, oats, barley and sorghum grains) 
19 U. S. Dept. Agr .• Commodity Stabilization Service. Grain Division 
Oct. 20. 1955. (Mimeo rept.) . 
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Fig. 7. Feed concentrate supply; feed concentrate production plus 
private and CCC (government) stocks. annually. 1937-56. 
in total. The chart also provides some perspective 
on the size of these stocks; it shows them in rela-
tion to total feed grain production, other grains 
fed and by-product feeds. It shows that, large as 
the carryover stocks have grown, they are still 
relatively small compared with total feeds produc-
tion. 
To take a specific case: The carryover of corn 
is the same size (a billion bushels) as the carry-
over of wheat. But the carryover of wheat is 
about equal to an average crop of wheat, while the 
carryover of corn is only equal to a third of an 
average crop of corn; and the carryover of total 
feeds is only about a quarter of an average total 
feeds crop. The question whether these carryover 
stocks are larger, or smaller, than needed for 
stabilization purposes is discussed in a later sec-
tion of this report. 
WHAT DETERMINES HOW MUCH CORN 
GOES UNDER LOAN?20 
Figure 4 in a preceding section of this report 
sho'Ys that when the open-market price of corn 
declmes below the loan rate, large quantities of 
corn generally go under loan. 
The nature of this relationship is shown more 
accurately in fig. 8. In the upper section of this 
chart, the quantity of corn put under loan each 
year is plotted against the difference between the 
average November-May United States farm price 
of corn and the corn loan rate for the same year. 
A general negative relationship is shown in fig: 
8, although there is a good deal of scatter among 
the dots for the recent years. This shows that 
some othe.r factor was also at work determining 
the quantIty of corn put tinder loan. 
A likely factor of this sort would be the size 
of the corn crop. To test whether this factor did 
affect the quantity of corn put under loan, we 
plotted the corn put under loan each year against 
the size of the corn crop that year. The correla-
20 This section summarizes work done by Allen Richards. 
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Fig. 8. Relation of corn placed under loan (support) to two factors (1) November-May average price 
minus loan rate and (2) eorn production. 
tion between the two series was quite low, indi-
cating that the size of the corn crop was not as 
influential a factor as the price-loan rate differ-
ential shown in fig. 8_ 
We next investigated whether the two factors, 
price-loan differential and size of corn crop, might 
determine the quantity of corn put under loan in 
combination. In the upper part of fig. 8, we con-
nected pairs of dots for those years when the size 
of the corn crop was similar, by light straight 
lines as shown in the chart. These light lines pro-
vided clues to the slope of the line of net influence 
of price-loan differential when the size of the crop 
is held constant. The heavy curved line was then 
drawn to represent this net influence, and the 
vertical residuals of the dots from this line were 
then plotted against the size of the corn crop in 
the lower part of the chart. 
There is still some scatter of the dots about the 
976 
line. The dots for the years 1933 and 1939, par-
ticularly, remain far off the line. Evidently, the 
two factors, price-loan rate differential and size 
of corn crop, explain most of the variation in the 
quantity of corn put under loan, but not all of it. 
The rest of the variation is caused by other fac-
tors as yet undetermined. One of them may be the 
extent of compliance with the acreage control pro-
gram. 
WHAT DETERMINES THE SIZE OF THE OCT. 1 
CCC CORN INVENTORY? 
What determines the size of the eee year-end 
carryover stocks? 
One likely factor to test is the size of the corn 
crop. This factor, however, would not be the size 
of the current corn crop, because the current crop 
does not come on the market until after Oct. 1. 
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Fig. 9. Average farm stocks of corn Oct. 1. 1946.55. by .tat .... North 
Central Region. 
The size of the growing corn crop is fairly ac-
curately forecast by the USDA by Oct. 1, but that 
forecast is not likely to have much effect on the 
CCC inventory that year. Accordingly, it would 
not be the size of the current corn crop that would 
affect the CCC inventory Oct. 1, but the size of 
the preceding corn crop. 
Comparison of the inventory and corn crop 
data shows, in fact, that there is a higher correla-
tion between the CCC Oct. 1 inventory and the 
size of the corn crop 2 years before than there is 
with the corn crop 1 year before. 
This 2-year lag results from the way the corn 
loan program operates. Farmers who put corn 
under loan from, say, the 1954 crop do not begin 
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deliveries to the CCC until July 1 of the following 
year-1955, at the earliest. Study of the cee 
inventory data by quarters shows that the highest 
point is reached in March of the ,next year (in 
the present example, March 1956). Apparently, 
the bulk of the deliveries are made after Oct. 1, 
1955 and therefore do not show up in the cec 
inventory until Oct. I, 1956. This is 2 years after 
the crop was harvested in 1954. 
By the time the 2 years have elapsed, several 
other factors affecting the release of corn from 
.the CCC inventory have been atl'Work. The simple 
correlation between crop size and CCC Oct. 1 in-
ventory therefore is not high. What these other 
factors are has not yet been determined. 
EFFECTS OF THE CORN PROGRAM ON 
THE LOCATION OF CORN STOCKS 
The data showing the distribution (location by 
quantities by states) of the stocks of old corn on 
farms Oct. 1 in the 12 states of the North Central 
Region are available from 1926 to 1955. Most of 
these stocks of corn are owned by farmers; small 
percentages, varying from year to year, are under 
reseal programs and loans in process of liquida-
tion. The original annual data by states from 
1926 to 1955 are too voluminous to include in this 
report. The average distribution for the past 10 
years by states in the North Central Region is 
shown in fig. 9. The states are shown in order of 
size of stocks. The height of the bars represents 
the average quantity of corn in the different states 
for the period 1946-55. 
The figure shows that the state with the largest 
stocks of corn is Iowa. About as much corn is held 
in Iowa as in the next 2 states (Illinois and Ne-
I'"' 
r- -
r-
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Fig. 19. Percentage of the farm stocks of corn Oct. 1 in the North Central Region that was held In Iowa. annually. 1926·66. 
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TABLE 8. CCC CORN BY STATES IN THE NORTH CENTRAL REGION. OCT. I, 1942-55. 
(1.000 bushels) 
State 1942 1943 1944 I 1945 I 1946 1947-1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Illinois.... . . . . . . ......... .. 11,947 318 124 7 1--1-,1-46-1'.-.. -.. -.. -.. -. -.. 1--81-,0-53-1'-4-1-,60-2-1--2-7 ,-53-1-1--71-,3-61-;'-12-3-,87-3-
~~~:~~:::::::::::::::::::: 9,5~g 22~ .. · .... 483 .......... is .. 1 ~g6 :::::::::::: 14~:m 12~:~ig 10~:~;~ IA~::~~ 2~~:g~~ 
Kansas.................... 45 6 ........................ 20............ 9,970 2,938 2,633 3,396 7,234 
Michigan.................. ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 812 31 8 3,60l 8,501 
Minnesota................. 4,915 89 25 0 72 .... ........ 35,796 30,153 21,958 31,242 87,704 
Missouri.... ............... 1,160 98 146 19 542 ....... ..... 9,037 1,711 3,375 8,772 14,843 
Nebraska.. ................ 5,630 16 234 66 194 ....... ..... 60,386 43,697 41,689 43,498 77,160 
North Dakota.... .......... .. .......... . ...... ..... .... ........ ... ......... ............ ....... ..... 1,425 1,053 387 504 1,289 
Ohio....................... 74 4 ........................ 452............ 5,410 3,934 3,446 7,469 12,535 
South Dakota.............. 2,149 158 5 .. .......... ............ ............ 31,697 27,363 25,781 17,579 42,793 
Wisconsin.................. 1,579 9 ........................ 143............ 2,345 573 383 4,069 6,659 
TOTAL................ 37,104 926 1,017 107 3,593 ............ 1 393,743 287,710 231,408 353,670 II 663,005 
Percent Iowaf Total......... 25.6 24.3 47.5 14.0' 14.5 ............ 1---37-.5.1---4-4.-9:,:---43-.8-:,._-3-8-.9 38.0 
braska) combined. Iowa's stocks equal 32.2 per-
cent of the corn on farms in the North Central 
Region. 
Figure 10 shows that the concentration of corn 
stocks in Iowa varies from year to year. The 
trend has been rising with the passage of time. In 
the late 1920's the percentage of the regional 
stocks held in Iowa varied from 11 to 23 percent. 
During World War II, it rose to a peak of 49 per-
cent in 1941. In the 1950's, it has varied from 20 
to 40 percent. 
It might be expected that the chief reason for 
the variations in the concentration of corn stocks 
in Iowa would be the variation in concentration 
of production in Iowa. The correlation between 
production one year and stocks the next year, 
however, is only 0.62. Other factors also must be 
at work; their nature as yet is undetermined. 
THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
CCC STOCKS OF CORN 
Are the eee stocks of corn distributed about 
the same as the farm stocks? 
Data showing the distribution (location by 
quantities by states) of the eee stocks of corn'as 
of Oct. 1 in the 12 states of the North Central 
Region are available annually from 1942 to 1946 
and 1951 to 1955. These data are given in table 
8. Data for the years 1947-50 were not compiled 
by the eee; the absence of data does not indicate 
that there were no stocks in those years (except 
for 1948). 
Because of this gap in the records, the 10-year 
average data, 1946-55, cannot be shown for direct 
comparison with the 1946-55 average farm stocks 
chart. 
Figure 11, however, shows that the eee stocks 
have been concentrated in Iowa much the same 
as the farm stocks have been, or a little more. 
Iowa eee stocks over the past 5 years averaged 
about 40 percent, even higher than the percentage 
of farm stocks (31 percent) over the same period. 
The data for all the states in the North Central 
Region the past 5 years, 1951-55, are shown sep-
arately by states and by years in fig. 12. This fig-
ure shows that a very high percentage of the cce 
stocks has been concentrated in 5 of the 12 states 
in the North Central Region (Iowa, Nebraska, 
978 
Illinois, Minnesota and South Dakota). This was 
true for all of the years, and to such an extent 
in 1952 that less than 2 percent of the eec stocks 
were stored in the' remaining 7 states of the 
region. For the first 3 of the past 5 years, Iowa 
held as much as any other three states combined, 
and for the other years (1954 and 1955) she held 
as much as any other two states. Thus the eee 
stocks of corn are more concentrated geographic-
ally than the farm stocks of corn. 
The heavy concentration of eee stocks in Iowa 
is interesting. Back in 1941, observers noted that 
ecc stocks were accumulating more heavily in 
Iowa than in the other states. It was thought then 
that the flat loan rate might be partly responsible 
for this. Corn prices normally are lower in Iowa 
than in most other areas because Iowa produces 
more corn than it consumes, and the surplus corn 
depresses prices in Iowa until it pays to ship corn 
out to other areas. Accordingly, prices in Iowa 
were low relative to the flat loan rate in effect 
from 1933 to 1941, and this, it was believed, 
caused large quantities of corn to be put under 
loan and eventually taken over by the eec. This 
belief was one of the reasons why geographical 
differentials in loan rates were instituted in 1941. 
But evidently eee stocks in Iowa are high under 
differential loan rates, much as they were under 
flat rates. 
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Is it efficient to have the CCC stocks heavily 
concentrated in Iowa and adjacent states in the 
central part of the North Central Region like 
this? 
It was thought at the beginning of this study 
that the problem of determining the most efficient 
(in this case, lowest cost) location of the stabiliza-
tion stocks would be amenable to linear program-
ming analysis. This would involve minimizing the 
sum of the several kinds of costs-(l) costs of 
storage, (2) costs of handling in and out, (3) 
costs of turning and other means of controlling 
insect and other deterioration, (4) costs of trans-
portation to and from storage, and so forth. 
It turned out, however, that the problem was 
simpler than this. The differences in costs at dif-
ferent geographical locations were not great, ex-
cept along the southern edge of the commercial 
corn area where high temperatures and humidity 
accelerate deterioration. Preliminary study of the 
movement of corn from surplus to deficit areas 
shows that there was a great deal of variation 
in quantity and even in direction of movement 
from one year to another, resulting chiefly from 
year-to-year variations in relative corn produc-
tion caused by weather. Thus corn might move 
out of storage in one direction one year, and in a 
different direction-even a reverse direction-
the next year. 
Since the corn put into storage one year will 
move in a direction that is unpredictable at the 
time, the way to incur the least transportation 
charges on the corn is simple: Store it as close 
as possible to where it was produced. And that, 
in essence, is what has been done. 
EFFECTS OF THE CORN PROGRAM 
ON CORN CONSUMPTION 
Figure 13 shows that previous to 1937, before 
the corn storage program got well under way, the 
utilization (consumption) of corn closely paral-
leled the production of corn each year. Table 2 
showed that before 1937 the stocks of corn carried 
over from big-crop years to small-crop years were 
comparatively small.21 After 1937, however, total 
carryover stocks more than doubled in size. They 
constituted more of a buffer or shock-absorber 
21 Data on utilization go back only as far as 1926. D,!ta on. stocks. 
however go back at least to 1900. A bull"tln pubbshed m 1937 
included' a study of production and carryover stocks from 1900 to 
1930 and reached these conclusions: • 
"Farmers !l.cting individually have in the past carried over a certam 
amount of corn from one year to the next. . • 
"The carryover is only a small percentage of the total crop; over 
the period from 1900 to 1930, it averaged only 3.8 percent of the 
crop. The amount carried over varied considerably from year to 
year, however ..• In general, the larger the crop the larger the 
carryover, and conversely. The biggest carryover was 11 per"ent 
of an average crop, "fter the largo; 1920 crop and the low prIces 
resulting from the post-war depre.slOn; the smallest carryover was 
1 percent after the small crop of 1901 .•• 
"On the average, an increase in. the siz~ of the corn croP. of 500 
million bushels i. followed by an mcrease m the amount carned over 
to the next crop year of 100 million bushel •. 
"Now 100 is on.".fifth of 500. Farmers in the past, therefore. acti,!g 
individually, have carried over on.".flfth of the s!,rpl~s after bIg 
crop year.. Perbaps a more accurate way to say it IS thIS: Farmers, 
by their storage actions, have reduced fluctuations in corn produc-
tion by one-fifth. The fluctuations In consumption and sale were 
only fou .... fifths as great as the fluctuations in production; the other 
on..-fifth went into storage." . 
(Shepherd, Geoffrey and Wilcox, Walter W. Stablizing corn supplIes 
by storage. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sla. Bul. 368. Dec. 1937, pp. 307-308.) 
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Fig. 13. United States production and utilization of corn by livestock, 
annually, 1926-65. 
between production and consumption.22 Table 9 
and fig. 13 show that the large carryover stocks 
after 1937 reduced the variation in consumption 
to something like half of the variation in produc-
tion. 
The extent of the stabilization of feed consump-
tion has been measured mathematically. "Storage 
programs for corn and other feed grains have in-
creased the stability of feed-grain consumption in 
recent years. During 1926-37 approximately 30 
percent of a year-to-year change in corn produc-
tion was taken up by changes in the rate. of accu-
mulation of carryover stocks of corn. About 60 
percent of a change in corn production was ab-
sorbed, on the average, by changes in livestock 
feeding. During 1938-50, on the other hand, 60 
percent of a year-to-year change in corn produc-
tion has been taken up by changes in the rate of 
stock accumulation and only 30 percent by 
changes in livestock feeding. The differences be-
tween these measures for the pre-program and 
program periods are statistically significant ac-
cording to usual criteria. They suggest that the 
price support and storage programs in force dur-
ing the past 12 to 15 years may have reduced the 
earlier variability of corn consumption by live-
stock as much as 50 percent)!3 
This conclusion is. stated only in terms of a 
suggestion, not a flat assertion. Other things hap-
22 The year 1947 i. an exception; carryover stocks bad been reduced 
to pre-1937 levels by the strong war and postwar demand just before 
1947. The buffer was small, so the short crop of 1947 reduced corn 
consumption sharply. . 
23 Source: Reserve levels for storable farm products. Senate Docu-
ment No. 130. May 13, 1954. P. 41. 
TABLE 9. PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION OF CORN, UNITED 
STATES, 1926-55. 
(million tons) 
67.2 73.2 
I Production Utilization of Total 1926 .... ~e.~.~~. ~~~~~~i.~~ ....... ___ O_~I_c~_:o_-:-I_oo_rn_b_Y_li_ve_st_oc_k l_ut_ih_'zs_ti_on_o_f o_or_o 
1927.......................... 73.3 70.4 76.8 
1928.......................... 74.6 66.0 73.2 
1929.......................... . 70.5 64.8 70.7 
1930................. ...... ... 58.2 52.5 57.5 
1931... .... .......... ...... ... 72.1 64.3 69.3 
1932.. ....... ........ ...... .. 82.0 73.5 78.8 
1933... .... ................... 67.1 63.1 68.5 
1934.......................... 40.6 44.1 49.2 
1935.......................... 64.4 55.7 61.9 
1936.......................... 42.2 42.5 48.1 
1037.......................... 74.0 56.5 65.8 
1938.......................... 71.4 58.8 65.2 
1939.......................... 72.3 62.5 69.4 
1940.......................... 68 8 63.2 70.0 . 
1941.......................... 74.3 70.0 78.6 
1942.......................... 85.9 81.5 89.5 
1943.......................... 83.0 80.2 87.4 
1944.......................... 86.5 76.1 84.3 
1945.......................... 80.3 76.9 84.4 
1946........ ..... ...... ..... .. 90.1 74.8 87.0 
1947.......................... 65.9 63.4 70.4 
1948.......................... 100.9 71.5 81.7 
1949.......................... 90.7 79.4 89.8 
1950....... .......... ......... 85.6 77.6 88.6 
1951... .... ................... 81.2 79.0 88.3 
1952.......................... 91.8 73.0 83.9 
1953.......................... 89.4 75.3 85.2 
1954.......................... 84.3 70.1 81.3 
1955.......................... 89.1 77.0 ................ 
Source: U. S. Dept. Agr., Agricultural Marketing Service. Grain and 
feed statistics through 1954. U. S. Dept. Agr. Stat. Bu!. 159. 
1956. pP. 2, 3; and U. S. Dept. Agr., Agricultural Marketing 
Service. The feed situation. November 1955. p. 5. 
pened from 1926-37 to 1938-50, along with the 
coming of the corn program, and they could have 
been the causes of the greater absorption of varia-
tions in corn production by inverse variations in 
corn storage. But table 7 shows that most of the 
increase in the inverse variation in corn storage 
during the 1938-50 period was accounted for by 
eee storage operations. This was true also for 
the years since 1950. These things support the 
conclusion suggested in the quotation above, that 
1000 
800 
1930 32 34 36 38 40 
the corn "price support and storage program" 
may have reduced the earlier variability of the 
consumption of corn by livestock as much as 50 
percent. 
If the stabilization operations of the eee re-
duced the variation in corn consumption by live-
stock about 50 percent, how was the remaining 
variation in corn consumption absorbed 'I 
The industrial utilization of corn takes only 
small and relatively constant quantities of corn. 
Figure 14 shows that most of the variation in 
the consumption of corn by livestock is absorbed 
by variations in hog production. These variations 
in hog production result from variations in the 
number of hogs fed and in the rate of feeding per 
hog. Poultry comes next in the order of varia-
bility. The other kinds of livestock account for 
only a relatively small amount of the variation 
in corn fed. 
Figure 15 shows that the situation for total con-
centrates is similar to the situation for corn.24 
SIZE OF STORAGE STOCKS NEEDED FOR 
ST ABILIZATION PURPOSES 
It is only since 1949 that the stocks of corn Oct. 
1 have been large enough to do a good stabilization 
job. Under the open market, before 1933, the 
amount of corn carried over from big-crop to 
small-crop years was only about one-fifth as large 
as necessary to stabilize supplies. There is some 
evidence that it would not have paid speculators 
to carry much more than this. But the objective 
of the corn loan program is not speculative grain; 
it is the stabilization of corn supplies. How big 
should corn stocks be to do this 'I 
We may look first at what would be required 
for complete stabilization of supplies, with de-
mand remaining constant (variations in demand 
24 The estimates shown in figs. 14 and 15 were prepared by R. D. Jen-
nings, Production Economics ResI'arch Branch, Agricultural Re-
search Service, U. S. Dept. Agr. 
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Fig. 15. All concentrates (excluding corn in silage) fed to different kinds of livestock. United States. 
annually. 1930-53. 
pose a separate problem, considered later in this 
report) . 
Past variations in corn production since 1890 
are shown in fig. 16. This chart shows that the 
long-run trend cannot be represented very well 
by a single straight line. Accordingly, the long-
run trend is represented by a moving average. 
The length of the moving average used here is 
11 years, centered on the middle year. 
Filling in the shortages from 1934 to 1936 
would have required stocks of nearly 2 billion 
bushels. But nothing like this succession of se-
verely short crops occurred at any other time dur-
ing the 87 years of record. It seems only common 
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Fig. 16. United States corn production. annually, 1890-1955, and 11-
year moving average trend. 
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sense to omit one of the two drouth years, 1934 
or 1936, as too exceptional to be included. 
If we omit 1936, the size of stocks required to 
stabilize corn supplies drops to 862 million bush-
els, the shortage in 1934. This would have been 
about right for 1901 and 1947 also. Working 
stocks of 100 to 150 million bushels would bring 
this figure to about 1 billion bushels. 
In the present stage of the science of weather 
forecasting, it is impossible to tell a year or more 
in advance when a short crop is going to come. 
Under these conditions, the best way to have stor-
age stocks on hand, ready to fill in a short crop 
when it does occur, is to build them up as rapidly 
as possible from big crop years and carry them 
until they are needed. 
This would be an easy thing to do if corn crops 
alternated regularly in size from large one year to 
small the next. But corn crops come in irregular 
sizes at irregular times. The storage rules have 
to be built on these irregular variations on the 
basis of statistical probabilities. 
The nature of the distribution of these irregular 
variations in corn production about the trend line 
is shown in fig. 17. This chart shows that the dis-
tribution is somewhat skewed to the left. There 
are not many short-crop years, but when they do 
come they are very short. In contrast, there are 
many large-crop years, but none of them are very 
large.2a 
study of the chronological order of occurrence 
of these different size crops shows that there is a 
tendency for several years of moderately good 
25 A similar chart based on Iowa corn yields shows a similar asym. 
metrical distribution. (F. V. Waugh. Graphic analysis in economics 
research. Agr. Handbook 84. U. S. Dept. Agr .• Agricultural Mar-
keting Service. June 1955. p. 5) 
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Fig. 17. Distribution of variations in corn production about tbe 11-
year moving average trend. Shaded portion of bars years from 
1900 to 1949; empty portion of bars years from 1870 to 1900. 
corn crops to come consecutively, followed by one 
or two severely short crops. Stabilization stocks, 
therefore; usually would build up over a period 
of several years and then be drawn down at one 
swoop. The stocks frequently would need to be 
carried for as long as 5 years at a time. Stocks 
would have accumulated like this for several years 
and then have been used up in 1 year, over several 
4, 5 or 6-year periods in the past-from 1875 to 
1881; from 1895 to 1901; from 1920 to 1924; 
from 1931 to 1934; and from 1942 to 1947. 
USDA ESTIMATE OF STABILIZATION STOCKS 
REQUIRED 
Our estimate of 1 billion bushels as the size of 
stabilization stocks needed to do a complete sta-
bilization job is the same as the figure reached 
independently by USDA analysts using a different 
approach. 2G These analysts, observing that most 
of the year-to-year variation in corn production 
results from variations in yields caused by the 
weather, studied the nature of these variations 
and set up the following objective of storage oper-
. ations as reasonable: To offset one very low yield 
and one moderately low yield in sequence, while 
maintaining minimum working stocks of about 
150 million bushels. This 2-year sequence of one 
very low yield and one moderately low yield could 
be expected on the average to occur about once 
every 12 years. When it occurred, it would create 
a deficit of about 850 million bushels. This deficit 
plus 150 million bushels adds up to 1 billion 
bushels. The storage program to smooth out the 
market supplies of corn completely, therefore, 
would need to accumulate up to 1 billion bushels 
of corn. 
After reaching this conclusion, the USDA an-
26 Reserve levels for storable farm products. Senate Document No. 130 
1952 p. 4. 
alysts go on to say that they do not consider it 
necessary to offset variations in corn production 
bushel for bushel by storage operations. They 
point out that there is some flexibility in feeding 
requirements, and that corn, important as it is, 
provides only about one-quarter of the total sup-
ply of livestock feeds, including other feed grains, 
by-product feeds, hay, range and pasture. 
It is true that corn provides only about one-
quarter of the supply of livestock feeds, if range 
and pasture are included. But the statement 
ignores the heterogeneity of the conditions under 
which the different kinds of livestock and feed 
are actually produced. Aggregating all livestock 
and all feeds like this covers up the dislocations 
that take place in specific parts of the livestock 
industry, particularly the hog industry. Corn 
provides about 75 to 80 percent of the total supply 
of livestock feed for hogs,27 and variations in 
corn production and prices have marked effects 
on hog production, as shown earlier in figs. 14 
and 15. 
Furthermore, at times when corn is scarce and 
high in price, oats and other feeds usually are 
scarce and high in price too. Physical and eco-
nomic limitations thus reduce the extent of substi-
tution of one feed grain for another below the 
extent permitted by nutritional considerations. 
Less substitution of feeds can take place than 
would be possible if the production of the different 
feed crops varied independently. 
The USDA analysts recognize this point a little 
later in their report. They say: "There is another 
factor, however, which tends to increase corn re-
quirements. Yields of other feed grains tend to 
fluctuate in the same direction as do yields of 
corn, so that the variation in total feed-grain pro-
duction is about 20 to 25 percent larger (in tons 
or equivalent bushels of corn) than in production 
of corn alone. To cover this additional source of 
variation would have required a total carryover 
of 900 million to 1 billion bushels of corn plus the 
equivalent of another 100 million bushels in the 
form of reserves of other grains in excess of 
working stocks." 28 
Our research leads us to a similar figure. Our 
conclusion is based upon the results of adding the 
production of the different feed grains together 
each year, to show how much variation there is 
in the total. 
It would not be accurate to add bushels, for a 
bushel of oats (32 pounds) is only a little more 
than half as heavy as a bushel of corn (56 
pounds). It is more accurate to add the grains 
on a poundage or tonnage basis. This is not fully 
accurate, for a pound of oats does not have as 
much feeding value as a pound of corn; it con-
tains a higher percentage of hull. But it is ac-
curate enough for our purposes.29 
27 R. D. Jennings. Consumption of feed by livestock. U. S. Dept. 
Agr. Cir. 836. 1949. p. 86. 
28 Reserve levels for storable farm product.. Senate Document No. 
130. 1952. p. 4. 
29 The problems of eaSe of storage and the stability of the grain in 
storage are additional but less important considerations which we 
cannot go into here. 
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Figure 18 shows the total production of the 
feed crops, corn, oats, barley and sorghum grains, 
added on a tonnage basis, annually since 1926 
when the data began. The ll-year moving aver-
age is shown too. 
Study of these data shows that the greatest 
shortage below the ll-year moving average oc-
cUlTed in 1934, the same as in the case of corn. 
We can leave the similar shortage in 1936 out of 
account here as an exception, as we did with corn. 
The shortage in the most severe drouth year, 
1934, was 35.8 million tons; the carryover at the 
end of the 1934 season, 3.5 million tons, brings 
this figure up to a total of 39.3 million tons as the 
minimum size of stocks needed to stabilize the 
total supplies of feed grains in 1936. A more re-
cent severe shortage year was 1947. The shortage 
in 1947 was 23.3 million tons, and the carryover 
at the end of the 1947 season was 7.8 million tons, 
the two quantities adding up to 31.1 million tons. 
It would be conservative statistical procedure 
to use the more recent and smaller 1947 figure of 
31.1 million tons rather than the larger 1936 
figure. This 31.1 million tons is equivalent in 
weight to 1.1 billion bushels of corn. This is more 
than the quantity of corn needed to stabilize corn 
supplies, which we estimated above to be 1 billion 
bushels. Evidently the variations in the produc-
tion of the different grains do not offset, but are 
positively correlated and reinforce each other. 
If storage costs for the different feeds were 
equal, stabilization stocks for each one would be 
desirable. In the case of oats, however, storage 
costs are high per unit of nutrition. A bushel of 
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Fig. 18. United Stntes total production of fed crops (corn, oats, barley 
and sorghum grains), added on a tonnage basis, 1926-55, and 
II-year moving average trend. 
984 
oats takes up the same space as a bushe~ of corn 
(both are defined as 5/4 of a cubic foot) but 
there is a high proportion of hull in oats (oats 
weigh 32 pounds per bushel, while corn weighs 
56) and the feeding value of a bushel of oats is 
only about half of the feeding' value of a bushel 
of corn. Accordingly, it would cost only half as 
much to store a given quantity of feed, in nutri-
tional terms, in the form of corn as in the form 
of oats. 
Feed grain storage costs would be minimized, 
therefore, if a substantial part of the oats element 
in the total feeds storage program were replaced 
by corn. Oats and corn are fairly close substi-
tutes within a certain range; beyond that range, 
substitution becomes'more difficult. Perhaps the 
program should go only about 100 million bushels 
in the direction of stabilizing oat supplies by corn 
storage, as the USDA analysts suggest. This 100 
million bushels of corn, added to the 1 billion 
bushels of corn required for corn stabilization, 
brings the total stocks of corn required for a feed 
grain stabilization program to 1.1 billion bushels. 
VARIATIONS IN DEMAND 
The preceding sections have dealt with storage 
operations to stabilize market supplies and prices 
against year-to-year variations in production. 
Are storage operations suited also to stabilizing 
against variations in demand? 
This is an entirely different matter from sta-
bilizing against year-to-year variations in pro-
duction. Variations in demand are not year-to-
year variations in the first place; they run from 
3 years in length, as in the case of the Korean 
conflict, to 10 years or more, as in the case of the 
depression of the 1930's and the war and postwar 
boom of the 1940's. And in the second place, the 
objective is not to stabilize supplies in line with a 
relatively constant demand, but to un stabilize 
them in line with a varying demand. 
Nevertheless, "stocks of storables can be very 
useful in allowing adjustments to these swings 
in demand. From the standpoint of building and 
maintaining a market for farm products, reserve 
stocks allow the effective demands of users or con-
sumers, both domestic and foreign, to be more 
surely and immediately met than will dependence 
on increasing acreages, which involves not only 
a considerable time lag but also the 50-50 chance 
that below average yields will further delay the 
ability to increase marketings. On downswings, 
a strong storage program can also be very useful 
in conserving supplies or maintaining efficiency. 
That is, very low prices in the past, for grains 
especially, have resulted in many instances in in-
creasing waste and inefficient feeding practices-
situations which dissipate resources and benefit 
no one. Storing surplus stocks under such cir-
cumstances not only conserves resources and sup-
ports market prices at the time but also enables 
farmers to better meet future increases in de-
mand." 30 
30 Reserve levels for storable farm products, Senate Document No. 
130. 1952. pp. 7-8. 
This indicates that additional quantities of 
corn, over and above the 1.1 billion bushels needed 
for stabilization against variations in supply, 
would be helpful in dealing with variations in 
demand. 
How large these additional quantities should 
be is an open question. In view of the longer time 
span of variations in demand, the quantities 
required could easily run into billions, and de-
terioration or the cost of rotating stocks to avoid 
deterioration would increase more than in pro-
portion to the length of the time span. This 
precludes the possibility of meeting these changes 
in demand adequately by storage operations, for 
the costs of storing additional billions of bushels 
would be prohibitive. A less costly and almost 
as fully effective plan would be to store only 
enough corn to meet an increase in demand for 
1 year. This would solve the problem created by 
the inherent time lag of about a year in corn 
production response. During that one year, ar-
rangements could be made to meet the increase in 
demand in subsequent years by increased pro-
duction. • 
How large should the storage stocks be for this 
one year? 
Some light can be thrown on this question by 
study of a specific year, 1947, when a strong de-
mand cut into the supply-stabilization stocks and 
left them too small to fill out the short crop har-
vested in the fall of 1947. Demand-stabilization 
stocks of something approaching half a billion 
bushels would have done the job then. Perhaps 
400 million would be a minimum figure. This 
quantity, added to the 1.1 billion needed for sta-
bilization against variations in supply, would 
make a total of 1.5 billion bushels.31 
COMPLETE STABILIZATION? 
Some observers object to completely smooth-
ing out the effects of variations in production by 
storage operations. It is stated that this would 
be uneconomic, because it would not result in a 
perfect market over time.32 For in a perfect 
market, prices would vary from year to year 
enough to cover the costs of storing surpluses in 
big crop years over to short crop years ;33 but if 
supplies were completely stabilized, there would 
be no rise in prices from large crop years to small 
crop years to cover the costs of storage. 
Two observations may be made on this point. 
In the first place, the objective of the corn 
stabilization program is to stabilize market sup-
plies, not to equalize storage costs and speCUlative 
gains. There is some evidence that in the open 
market before the eee was created, private 
31 Work on the development of storage rules is in progress at Iowa 
State College. The work centers around an attempt to find a way 
of determining carryout so that the marginal social cost of feed 
grain storage for the ith time period equals the marginal social 
cost of the consumption unevenness that could be avoided by in-
creasinl> the feed grain storage of the ith time period. 
32 Holbrook Working. Price supports and the effectiveness of hedg-
ing. Jour. Farm Econ. Proc. 35 :5. Dec. 1953. P. 811. 
33 Geoffrey Shepherd. Marketing farm products: economic analysis. 
Iowa State College Press. Ames. Iowa. 1955. Ch. 2. 
speCUlation brought the grain market reasonably 
close to the criterion of perfection over time; the 
gains from carrying grain over from years of low 
prices to years of high prices were about equal 
to the costs. If an equivalence of storage costs 
and speculative gains were the objective, that was 
already attained in rough and ready fashion under 
the open market. But that was the market the 
eee was created to get away from. 
It may well be that eee loan rates at fixed 
percentages of parity got too far away from cost 
considerations to be practical. The flexible loan 
rates written into the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1938 but later discarded, and the table of 
loan rates in the Agricultural Act of 1949, may 
represent a sensible intermediate point between 
the open market and complete stabilization. The 
table provides for reducing the loan rate by 1 
percentage point for each 2-percentage-point in-
, crease in total corn supply. This is a loan rate 
elasticity of a little less than -2.0; for 1 percent 
measured from the 90 percent of parity base 
which the table starts from is actually 1.1 percent 
(of 90). The corn loan rate elasticity, then, is 
2/-1.1 = -1.8. This is about three times as high 
as the open-market corn price elasticity. 
In the second place, the way the eee operations 
actually work out renders it unlikely that com-
plete stabilization can be attained in any case. 
There is enough corn that is not eligible for loan 
on account of grade, and enough farmers who do 
not qualify for loans or who do not go to the 
bother of taking one out, that less than complete 
stabilization is attained as a matter of actual 
practice whether it is desirable or not. 
Finally, the costs of the storage program need 
to be taken into account. The costs in 1953-54 
and 1954-55 were $75 million to $85 million a 
year, as shown in an earlier section of this report; 
it seems likely that they will run higher in the 
future, perhaps around $100 million. Storage 
costs rise rapidly as the degree of stabilization 
comes closer to completeness and larger stocks 
are carried for longer periods of time. It seems 
unlikely that drastic changes in the storage pro-
gram, which would permit more complete stabili-
zation, will be made. For example, it seems un-
likely that the present system of nonrecourse 
loans to farmers will be replaced by outright eee 
purchases and sales, because that would cost more 
and would also "put the government in the grain 
business" far more than it is at present. Taking 
all these things into account, it seems likely that 
the degree of stabilization attained in the future 
will fall some distance short of completeness. 
To summarize, then: 
(1) There is a fairly solid statistical basis for 
concluding that the size of stocks required for 
complete stabilization of corn and other livestock 
feed supplies against variations in production is 
about 1.1 billion bushels. 
(2) There is a less solid foundation for the 
conclusion that if some degree of stabilization 
against variations in demand is desired during 
the first year when a change in demand takes 
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place, stocks of the order of 400 million bushels 
would be needed, in addition to the 1.1 billion re-
quired under (1) above. The total, therefore, 
would be 1.5 billion bushels. 
(3) Complete stabilization appears to be un-
attainable under existing arrangements, so a prac-
tical working size of storage stocks for the 
present type of program would be substantially 
less than 1.5 billion bushels. How much less can-
not as yet be determined on a firm statistical 
basis. A round figure of 1 billion bushels would 
be a reasonable quantity. 
MAINTAINING I-BILLION-BUSHEL STOCKS 
This 1 billion bushels is the size of stocks that 
the program would aim to accumulate during good 
crop years, to have on hand to fill in very short 
crops such as 1947, 1936 or 1934 and 1910, or 
moderately short crops such as 1951, 1930, 1924 
and 1913. 
No one can tell when a short crop is coming. In 
many cases, after 1 billion bushel stocks have been 
accumulated, another good crop (or two, or more) . 
may come along before the short crop comes. The 
good crop or crops may be expected to increase 
the size of stocks above 1 billion bushels, if loan 
rates and prices are kept at the same levels as 
before. 
Provision can be made to keep this accumula-
tion of stocks above 1 billion bushels within 
moderate bounds by setting up a schedule which 
would automatically lower the loan rates when-
ever the stocks grew larger than 1 billion bushels. 
The flexible loan rates in the present legislation 
referred to above are a step in this direction. 
Another form of this sort of schedule, outlined 
below, might keep stocks more nearly in line 
with the desired goal. 
The proposal is that whenever corn supplies 
exceeded 4.2 billion bushels (an average crop of 
3.2 billion bushels plus stabilization stocks of 
1 billion bushels) the loan rate would be reduced 
in proportion to the excess. That is, if total corn 
supplies were 4.4 billion bushels (roughly 5 per-
cent in excess of 4.2 billion), the loan rate would 
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be reduced 5 percent. This would automatically 
bring the loan rate down toward the long-run 
working level needed for stabilization purposes. 
A reduction of 5 percent in the loan rate would 
increase corn consumption about 3 percent. It 
also would reduce corn production the next year 
to some extent, for illustration, 2 percent. Thus, 
the total supply of corn the next year would be 
reduced to 4.2 billion bushels. The loan rate then 
would go back up to its former level. 
But this would put the loan rate back too high 
and induce supplies in excess of stabilization 
needs again. This could be avoided by adding a 
further provision: Whenever the total supplies 
exceeded 4.2 billion bushels, the loan rate would 
automatically be reduced as above; but, instead 
of going back up to its original level (if total 
supplies the next year fell below 4.2 billion bush-
els), the rate would stay at the new lower level. 
The loan rate then would stay at this lower 
level, probably for the next several years. But if 
the total corn supply continued to be above 4.2 
billion bushels, the loan rate would be lowered 
each year in proportion to the excess over 4.2 
billion bushels-until the resulting increase in 
corn consumption and decrease in corn production 
brought the level of supplies down to 4.2 billion 
bushels or less. The rate would continue then at 
this lower level unless stocks fell below some mini-
mum safe level, say 500 million bushels, when 
the loan rate would be raised in proportion to the 
shortage. 
In effect, this would provide stable loan rates 
while supplies ranged between 3.7 billion and 
4.2 billion bushels. But it would move the rates 
up or down whenever supplies fell outside of this 
range. 
Thus, the right long-run level of loan rates 
would be reached, a level that would smooth out 
most of the year-to-year variation in supplies-
without leading either to a long-run accumulation 
of excessive stocks or to insufficient stocks. The 
rate then would remain unchanged for a number 
of years at a time, until stocks rose above the 
maximum or fell below the minimum. 
